U.S. v. Daren W. Phillips: Search and Seizure in the Digital Age

June 2024 | Oscar Cuevas (Editor-in-Chief)

Introduction:

In the digital age, the intersection between privacy rights and law enforcement’s investigatory power presents complex legal challenges, particularly concerning the contents of personal electronic devices. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. Yet, the parameters of these protections become blurred when differentiating under what circumstances can personal data from digital devices be used as evidence without violating constitutional rights. 

Facts: 

In United States of America v. Daren W. Phillips, [1] Daren Phillips was convicted on charges of possessing child pornography after his former fiancee, Amanda Windes, reported the information to law enforcement. [2] Windes, having suspicions about Phillips, accessed his laptop by resetting the password, and later discovering illegal content. [3] She brought the laptop to the Washoe County Sheriff’s Office.[4] At the sheriff’s office, Detective Gregory Sawyer instructed Windes only to show him the images she had previously viewed, ensuring she did not expand the scope of her initial private search. [5] Phillips entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of child pornography, reserving the right to appeal in the event that his motion to suppress the evidence is denied, which he claimed was derived from an unlawful search. 

Issue: 

Should the evidence discovered on Philips’s laptop be excluded from court proceedings? Phillips contended that the search was unconstitutional, citing the absence of prior knowledge by law enforcement and an illegal search based on intent, as outlined in United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). [6] Under the Jacobson (1984) ruling, the Supreme Court ruled that the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) did not need to attain a warrant for a search (given they had one from a previous, similar search) and, thereby, did not infringe upon the Fourth Amendment’s “search and seizure” clause. Similarly, the “common-law trespassory test” outlined in United States v. Jones (2012) [7] requires suppression in this case, as a private computer is considered a function of personal privacy, and a warrantless intrusion of such would violate the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, Phillips argued that the search was impermissible because Windes acted as a state agent when she accessed the laptop at the sheriff’s office, and Detective Sawyer could not holistically base his judgment on whether Windes’ had accurately reenacted the initial search. 

Ruling: 

The appellate court mainly relied on precedents set forth in Jacobsen and United States v. Bowman (2000), [8] which provided reasons for evidence being permissible when it is replicated in the presence of law enforcement without exceeding the scope of the initial private intrusion. The panel noted that Windes did act as a state agent, and it was still permissible under the Jacobsen (1984) ruling. The Supreme Court held in Jacobsen (1984) that the FedEx employees’ earlier private search and decision to alert law enforcement to their findings made the agent’s warrantless search permissible. In connection to the Phillips’ case, Windes decided to inform law enforcement of her findings despite obtaining the information without the consent of Phillips. Evidence points to the fact that when Windes accessed the child pornography on Phillip’s computer at the sheriff’s office, she merely mimicked her earlier private search and listened to Sawyer so as not to show him anything she had not already seen. The panel also addressed Phillips’ argument in how Jacobsen (1984) does not apply in this scenario because there are conditions that were not met in this case. These conditions primarily include Sawyer's lack of virtual certainty. In a legal context, "virtual certainty" is a term often used to describe a situation where an outcome or consequence of an action is so likely to occur that it can be confidently expected. This term is particularly relevant in criminal law and tort law to determine liability or culpability. The panel responded that Jacobsen’s “virtual certainty” doesn’t create any subjective requirements, and the language is intended to illustrate an objective test about the scope of the searches. The Supreme Court ruled in Jacobsen (1984) that as long as a government search does not exceed the bounds of a private one, it is, therefore, not an invasion of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. Likewise, Sawyer didn’t learn anything new that had not previously been discovered during Windes’ private search, and therefore, “the search is permissible.” The panel asserted that United States v. Young (2009) [9] didn’t support Phillips' argument regarding “virtual certainty” as to the nature of the content of his laptop. In Young, the government appealed a district court's decision to suppress evidence obtained from Michael Young's hotel room without a warrant, arguing against the district court's finding that the search and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. The case unfolded when a hotel staff, after mistakenly giving Young a key to another guest's room, entered his room in his absence to search for missing items, discovering a firearm in a backpack but not the items in question. Young, unaware of being locked out or evicted, found his key no longer worked and, upon contacting staff, was confronted by police, leading to his arrest for possessing a firearm as a felon. The appellate court affirmed the district court's suppression, ruling that since Young was not evicted, he retained an expectation of privacy in the room, upholding the decision to suppress the evidence found. In the case of Phillips, compared to Young, it did not involve a warrantless entry into a home or its equivalent; instead, it was a search into his private computer. While Phillips argued that the extensive amount of personal information contained was similar to a private residence, the argument was quickly overruled by Burdeau v. McDowell (1921), in which the validity of this conduct does not depend on the extent of the private information contained in the object or location in which the private party intruded. The last argument was the common-law trespassory test set in Jones (2012) and Jacobsen (1984), in which Phillips argued that if Windes had not previously viewed the files containing child pornography on his computer, it did not give law enforcement the authority to intrude on his property again physically; and contends that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Phillips' argument by pointing out that Jacobsen supports the notion that law enforcement officers didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment when they mimicked a prior private trespass and gathered information. The Ninth Circuit Court also cited United States v. Tosti (2013), [10] where a computer technician uncovered child pornography on the defendant's computer. Law enforcement directed the technician to open and view the images, and the appeals court ruled that it didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment. The appeals court asserted that law enforcement didn’t need a warrant, citing cases that had applied Jacobsen (1984) to warrantless searches of modern digital devices.  

Conclusion: 

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the evidence obtained from Phillips’s laptop was admissible as Windes's actions at the sheriff's office did not exceed the scope of her initial private search. The appellate court also upheld the legality of the challenged conditions of Phillips's supervised release, aligning with precedent that defines the permissible statutory penalty and constitutional boundaries. The only opinion given by District Judge Edward Korman decided to reject all of Philips' objections to using evidence obtained from his computer and the three conditions of his supervised release. This precedent could have consequences for future cases, especially those involving digital evidence. It underscores the legal distinction between private searches conducted by individuals and those carried out by law enforcement, suggesting that evidence obtained from digital devices by private parties can be used by the police without a warrant as long as their investigation does not reveal new information not already exposed by the private search. This could lead to an increased reliance on evidence gathered from digital devices by non-governmental actors, as it affirms the legality of law enforcement using such evidence in their investigations without necessitating a warrant, assuming they adhere strictly to the confines of the initial private discovery. However, more precedent would have to be laid forth in regard to resetting another person’s password. As it constitutes several crimes that include unauthorized access, computer fraud, and identity theft. Law enforcement can access someone’s personal information as part of an investigation, but having probable cause and a warrant would make sure that law enforcement is not in violation of laws designed to protect individuals rights. Furthermore, this ruling emphasizes the evolving interpretation of privacy rights in the context of digital information and technology, indicating a nuanced approach to applying Fourth Amendment protections. As digital devices continue to play a central role in daily life, containing vast amounts of personal information, the implications of this precedent will likely be scrutinized and debated in legal circles and beyond, affecting how privacy, consent, and search and seizure laws intersect in the digital age.

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Sources

1. United States of America v. Daren W. Phillips, No. 20-10304 (9th Cir. 2022).

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984)

7.  United States v. Jones 565 U.S. 400 (2012)

8. United States v. Bowman, 215 F.3d 951(9th Cir. 2000)

9.  United States v. Young F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 2009)

10.  United States v. Tosti (9th Cir. 2013)