Russian Nuclear Weapons and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
April 2023 | Mary Giandjian (Staff Writer & Editor)
Speculations of potential nuclear warfare put global citizens at unrest and Russia's announcement of tactical nuclear sharing reminded the international world of destructive prospects anticipated in 2022. On March 25 2023, President Vladimir Putin publicly declared his intention to store Russian tactical nuclear weaponry in neighboring country and longtime ally, Belarus. Bilateral relations of Belarus and Russia have recently driven Belarusian support for the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Putin’s decision, announced late March, in no way, lessened nuclear tensions between the West and Russia. Though, the United States and Russia—once engaged in neutrality—signed the United Nations’ Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), international attention gathered once more following Russia’s announcement, drawing a question of whether or not weapon storage in Belarusian territory violates the Non-Proliferation Treaty. [1] Both Belarus and Russia answered that it does not, citing the United States’ own power sharing agreement among North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. [2]
Russia’s tactical nuclear weapon storage in Belarus incited international speculation. The Republic of Belarus’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared, “[t]he strategic partnership between Belarus and Russia is based on the geographic location, close historic and cultural links between both countries and peoples, economic ties and cooperation between the Belarusian and Russian businesses.” [3] At the beginning of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War, however, Belarus worked to uphold relations with Kiev, the capital of Ukraine. A few days after the war’s commencement, a referendum in Belarus’ Parliament on February 27, 2022 saw to the constitution’s amendment in order to join Russian military operations. [4] Following Belarus’ switch to support Russia, it should be noted the two “have set up a joint regional military force” to “coordinate their air defense systems, perform joint military exercises, consider a number of questions regarding operative and combat training.” [5] Putin noted that ten Belarusian aircrafts have been upgraded to grant capabilities to carry nuclear weapons. The operations are said to begin April 7, Putin estimates the storage facilities, as well as Belarusian pilots and aircrafts, will be ready by July 1, 2023.
Knowing the operations to come, legality can only be assessed after examining the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), signed in 1968 and put into effect in 1970, currently holds 190 Parties to the Treaty, following North Korea’s withdrawal in 2003. The Treaty’s objective reads: “to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.” [6] This treaty, the only multilaterally-binding agreement with the goal of disarmament, was extended indefinitely in 1995. Defined in the Treaty as having “manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967,” the U.S. and Russia are two of five NPT designated nuclear weapon states. [7] Belarus, having joined the Treaty in 1994, declared itself among the non-nuclear states and ceded the nuclear missiles and weapons to Russia.
Governing sites from both parties involved have come forward in defense on the March 25 decision. Putin explained that the weapon sharing with Belarus was an anticipated response to Britain supplying armor-piercing shells to Ukraine amidst the war. The resulting controversy, as per President Putin, was a hypocritical backlash. Putin addressed the international community by citing the United States’ own nuclear power sharing agreement with Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey under NATO. This power sharing agreement allows for the storage of roughly 100 American B-61 gravity bombs in said countries as well as necessary training in the case of deployment. Russia argues that the United States violated the 1968 treaty by distributing the nuclear weapons to European countries, clarifying that, “We [Russia] agreed that we will do the same – without violating our obligations, I emphasize, without violating our international obligations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.” [8]
Belarusian president, Alexander Lukashenko, reinforced the statement made by Putin, clarifying that the agreed weapons storage cannot be considered a violation of the treaty since Belarus will have no authority or oversight to the weaponry. Yukashenko’s comment served as a reminder to the international community that the United States, in sharing nuclear weaponry with European states, remained in control of the distributed weapons. Similarly, Belarus will have no jurisdiction over Russian tactical nuclear weapons. Article I of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty restricts the transfer of weaponry, it reads:
“Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly….” [9]
The defense testimonies by Putin and Lukashenko, while calling attention to the United States’ own decisions, bring forth a question of treaty enforcement: what can and will the international community do? To evaluate the present, a case of the past can be considered. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), also known as North Korea, joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state in 1985 and agreed to cease nuclear weapon manufacturing and allow for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to perform inspections. [10] North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003 in pursuit of nuclear weapon manufacturing, with the argument that the United States was “threatening” its security by “hostile policy.” [11] North Korea, however, was permitted to withdraw from the NPT, as stated in Article X. The Treaty reads that parties, in recognition of national sovereignty, are able to withdraw from the Treaty in “extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” [12] Each withdrawing party must give notice of such withdrawal to “all other parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.” [13]
After providing a notice three months in advance, North Korea left the Treaty in 2003 after 18 years of membership. The North Korean case, therefore, serves as an example to the application of international treaties. While the withdrawal was valid under Article X’s conditions, the United Nations Security Council could have nonetheless ruled a threat to peace given the DPRK's explicit intent to resume missile testing. Under Chapter VII of the United Nations charter, the United Nations Security Council has the right to enforce “economic, diplomatic or even military sanctions” on North Korea. [14]
Besides North Korea, there has been a variety of non-compliance to the NPT that can also determine Russia’s future. Iran was another state seeking nuclear weapon capabilities, despite being a party to the NPT since 1970. In 2005, as it also concluded for North Korea, the IAEA found Iran in violation of the treaty’s safeguard, more specifically Article III. Iran disputed the uranium enrichment, the grounds for its violation accusation, by citing “peaceful” intentions under Article IV. The United Nations Security General at the time, Ban Ki-moon, had publicly displayed hopes for a resolution. Regardless, Iran faced sanctions for the treaty’s violation, some of which were imposed by former President Obama who expressed an intolerance for failure to maintain the obligations. Sanctions were then lifted from Iran by July 2015, but the path from noncompliance to consequence is one standing possibility for Russia if Putin’s claims become true in July 2023.
In the possibility of Russian non-compliance to the NPT, the other States involved have options of what to pursue. First, though the treaty is not immediately terminated upon breach, other parties involved may act as a continuing force, in which the legal obligations would continue or choose to terminate the treaty themselves. International treaties are upheld by the general will of parties involved – by consensus ad idem. Though the option of termination is available upon the necessary support, doing so has the potential to set a harmful precedent. To disband such an expansive, legally-binding agreement of nuclear deterrence would likely allow for nuclear developments. In this case, favor contractus, which describes greater benefit from continuing a contract over letting it expire, is supported by the “moral nature of international legal obligation” also known as pacta sunt servanda. [15]
The typical response to international treaty violations has been legal penalties and moral condemnation of guilty states. [16] Given the number of parties to the treaty, the ultimate jurisdiction resides with the United Nations Security Council as it could also apply sanctions or varying legal action to Russia if it determines that weapon storage was a violation of the NPT’s terms. While the treaty has no specification on exchanged weapons storage, the possibility of violation lies in Putin’s statement of training Belarusian servicemen to handle the newly stored weaponry. It must be noted that the situation following Putin’s March 23 declaration is full of uncertainty as the international community debates possibilities of tactical nuclear weapons actually being stored in Belarus. Prospective changes will not be fully understood until July 2023, the estimated time of completion as per Putin. The future of the matter residing with the United Nations, as written in the treaty, is one “considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war.” [17]
Sources
Murdock, Clark A., Franklin Miller, and Jenifer Mackby. “Trilateral Nuclear Dialogues Role of P3 Nuclear Weapons Consensus Statement.” CSIS, May 13, 2010
Al Jazeera. “Why Does Russia Want Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Belarus?” Russia-Ukraine war News. March 28, 2023
“Belarus and Russia.” Belarus and Russia - Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus. Accessed April 27, 2023
Mudrov, Sergei A. “‘We did not unleash this war. Our conscience is clear.’The Russia–Ukraine military conflict and its perception in Belarus. Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe.” 30:2, (2022). 273-284, DOI: 10.1080/25739638.2022.2089390
“Belarus and Russia.” Belarus and Russia - Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus. Accessed April 27, 2023
“Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Accessed April 27, 2023
Ibid.
Al Jazeera English. “Ukraine Says Russia ‘Took Belarus as a Nuclear Hostage.’” YouTube, March 26, 2023
“Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Accessed April 27, 2023
Bai, Su. “North Korea's Withdrawal from the NPT: Neorealism and Selectorate Theory.” E-International Relations, January 28, 2022
“North Korea's Withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.” American Society of
International Law, January 24, 2003
“Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Accessed April 27, 2023
Ibid.
Doyle, Thomas E. “The moral implications of the subversion of the Nonproliferation Treaty regime, Ethics & Global Politics, 2:2, 131-153, DOI: 10.3402/egp.v2i2.1916
Ibid.
Ibid.
“Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Accessed April 27, 2023